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INTRODUCTION
USF&G showed in its Appellant Brief that the policy at issue
is not ambiguous and the interpretation made is consistent not only
with policy language, but with case law interpreting that policy
language and the commentators thereon.

An examination of the

Appellees# Brief shows that the ambiguity claimed is contrived by
juxtaposing two policy provisions and construing them out of
context of their general application.
The

law is well established

that even though insurance

contracts are to be construed against the insurer, the insurer is
still entitled to a fair and plain interpretation of the language
used in the commercial context in which it is raised. Valley Bank
& Trust Co. v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. of Dallas. 776 P.2d 933
(Utah App. 1989).

Insurance policies should be construed to

accomplish the intention of the parties while giving meaning to the
language used

in a plain and ordinary sense not contriving

ambiguity, but attempting to accomplish the general purpose of the
contract.

See, Prosser Com'n Co., Inc. v. Guaranty National

Insurance Company, 700 P.2d 1188 (Wash. App. 1985).
What follows is an examination of how the Appellees7 Brief
errs in analysis by taking independent contract provisions out of
context and putting them together in a manner to create ambiguity.
In fact, an examination of the record will show that the appellees
have never established on the record that they did not receive that
for which they contracted nor were they subjectively of the view
that ambiguity existed.
1

ARGUMENT
Review of Operation of the Policy
It is a difficult proposition to prove in an appellate brief
that a contract provision is or is not ambiguous. This difficulty
arises because a finding of ambiguity is subject to the understanding and interpretation of reading given by each party and judge
deduced from simply reading the document in light of guiding
principles of law.
A mere reading of the USF&G policy makes clear the nature of
the insurance transaction entered.

The Sandts purchased underin-

sured motorist coverage for the purpose of obtaining insurance
coverage up to $300,000 should another at fault injure one of them
and prove to have a lesser amount of insurance.

The obvious

purpose of this coverage is not to create an excess coverage of
some kind, but to make sure that up to $300,000 in coverage exists
in a state where many carry the minimum of $20,000 liability
coverage.

The policy then allows the limit of liability to be

reduced by the payment of another party which might injure one of
the Sandts.

The net effect of that limit of liability is to

maintain the desired $300,000 of resource should an accident occur.
When one buys an orange, it is expected it will be spherical,
orange in color, and have a peel.

One expects that because of the

inherent nature of the product being bought.

Similarly, when one

buys underinsured motorist coverage, one expects to have coverage
which takes into consideration the payment of a tort-feasor and
provide protection up to a certain limit.
2

To argue that this

coverage is somehow excess over the coverage of the tort-feasor is
to call the product something else than what it is by common
understanding.

The very label "underinsured" acknowledges that

some funds are available from another party and that one is
attempting

to accomplish being

fully

insured.

There

is no

subterfuge in this concept which applies the plain language of the
policy describing

limits of liability.

While

insurance law

correctly rejects technical language traps for insureds, some
assumption in balance must be made that one knows the basic nature
of what has been purchased.
The Claim of Ambiguity is Without Substance
Appellees strain to create the ambiguities necessary to
establish their position.

For example, on page seven of the

Appellees' Brief, they analyze the law applicable to exclusions.
No exclusion is at issue in this litigation.
What is at issue in this litigation is a limit of liability
provision.
given.

In plain language, it sets out the amount of coverage

It is significant that the Sandts have not alleged any

ambiguity in the limit of liability provision itself.

Instead,

they attempt to create ambiguity by construing the plain language
of the limit of liability provision with the "other insurance"
clause.
The Sandts argue to the court that the "other insurance"
clause found in the underinsured motorist coverage creates an
ambiguity. They argue that the phrase "similar insurance" could be
construed to apply to liability insurance on the Sturges' vehicle
3

from Farmer's Insurance Company. This attempted construction does
not work for several reasons in addition to those stated in the
USF&G principal Brief.
First, the appellee's proposed interpretation requires that
one must read out the limit of liability language entirely from the
policy.

Instead of attempting to harmonize the contract provi-

sions, appellees propose that the "other insurance" clause override
the limit of liability provisions.

This is inconsistent with the

rules of construction providing that language should be construed
to have effect.
Second, page three of the policy, dealing with liability
insurance, contains an "other insurance" clause which is similar.
See Addendum.

Taking the policy as a whole, it is difficult to

conceive that the "other insurance" clause in the underinsurance
coverage somehow reaches forward in the policy and replaces the
"other insurance" clause in the liability portion. The location of
the clause in the underinsurance coverage shows it is addressing
underinsurance issues.
Similarly, there is an "other insurance" clause on page four
of the policy with respect to medical payments coverage and again
on page six with respect to uninsured motorist coverage. In short,
to the average reader of the whole policy it is clear that the
"other insurance" clause at issue applies to the portion of the
policy (underinsured motorist coverage) in which it appears and is
not some loose conceptual cannon creating ambiguity.

4

See also

Amendment of Policy Provisions - Utah contained in the policy for
another "other insurance" clause reproduced in the Addendum.
Appellees7

interpretation

is also out of the commercial

context of the policy. As pointed out in our principal Brief, Sean
Sandt was not an "insured" under the policy covering the vehicle
involved in the accident.

The liability payment made to him by

Farmer's Insurance for the Sturges family was as a claimant.
Consequently, when the "other insurance" clause talks about other
insurance coverage, one must assume from plain logic that the
policy is talking about the persons to whom it is written, i.e.,
the insureds of USF&G.

With that understanding in place, it is

clear that the "other insurance" policy clause is simply telling
the Sandts that if they have other underinsured motorist coverage
insurance, USF&G will prorate its share of the loss with other
insurers.

If a member of the Sandt family is injured in a non-

owned vehicle, the USF&G coverage will be excess to any other
insurance coverage available to the Sandts as insureds. Except for
the personal injury protection coverage of the vehicle involved,
Sean Sandt was not an insured of Farmer's. The USF&G coverage is
excess only to the Farmer's PIP coverage. To hold otherwise would
create a whole new concept of law holding that a claimant under
another's liability coverage is actually an insured despite no such
definition in any policy.

The argument advanced by appellees is

clearly strained and taken out of the usual context of what might
be expected of the understanding of a person of average comprehension.

5

Finally, appellees claim on page 12 of their Brief that there
must be some ambiguity because an insured would never collect the
full $300,000 if the liable party always had some insurance. That
conclusion is partially correct because the negligent party may
make a payment out of his/her own resources rather than insurance,
but without legal significance.

The policy clearly explains what

underinsured coverage is and how payment from the liable person is
subtracted.

The complaint of appellees is that they do not like

the very nature of the product purchased.
ambiguity.

That complaint is not

Nothing was hidden about the nature of underinsured

coverage as it is fully explained in the policy.
CONCLUSION
The heart of this appeal is whether the policy reasonably
informs the insured that an offset will be made against the
underinsured coverage for payments made by the negligent party
causing injury. No real dispute exists that the Limit of Liability
provisions are not ambiguous. Appellees try to create ambiguity by
taking plain limitation of liability language and distorting the
meaning by comparing it with the "other insurance" clause which, in
turn, is being misinterpreted by ignoring its well understood
purpose, its commercial context, and the plain meaning of its
language.
This court should reverse the district court and hold that
USF&G filled its obligation by the $200,000 paid.

6

DATED this

I

day of August, 1991.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.

GREGORY J ."'SANDERS', ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM "A"
Policy Pages 3, 4, and 6
[Taken from Record pp. 45 - 68 J

LIMIT OF LIABILITY

EXCLUSIONS (Continued)
a. private passenger auto;
b. pickup or van that you own; or
c

"trailer" used with a vehicle described in
a. orb. above.

A. The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for
this coverage is our maximum limit of liability for
all damages resulting from any one auto accident.
This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:
1. "Insureds;"

8. Using a vehicle without a reasonable belief
that that person is entitled to do so.

2. Claims made;

9. For "bodily injury" or "property damage" for
which that person:

3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or

a. is an insured under a nuclear energy liability policy; or
b. would be an insured under a nuclear energy liability policy but for its termination
upon exhaustion of its limit of liability.
A nuclear energy liability policy is a policy issued by any of the following or their successors:
a. American Nuclear Insurers;
b. Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters; or
c. Nuclear Insurance Association of Canada.
B. We do not provide Liability Coverage for the ownership, maintenance or use of:
1. Any motorized vehicle having fewer than four
wheels.
2. Any vehicle, other than "your covered auto,"
which is:
a. owned by you; or
b. furnished or available for your regular
use.
3. Any vehicle, other than "your covered auto,"
which is:
a. owned by any "family member;" or
b. furnished or available for the regular use
of any "family member."
However, this exclusion (B.3.) does not apply
to your maintenance or use of any vehicle
which is:
a. owned by a "family member;" or
V

b. furnished or available for the regular use
of a "family member."

D D n n n i A i i ft&

4. Vehicles involved in the auto accident.
B. We will apply the limit of liability to provide any
separate limits required by law for bodily injury
and property damage liability. However, this provision (B.) will not change our total limit of liability.
OUT OF STATE COVERAGE
If an auto accident to which this policy applies occurs
in any state or province other than the one in which
"your covered auto" is principally garaged, we will interpret your policy for that accident as follows:
A. If the state or province has:
1. A financial responsibility or similar law specifying limits of liability for "bodily injury" or
"property damage" higher than the limit
shown in the Declarations, your policy will provide the higher specified limit.
2. A compulsory insurance or similar law requiring a nonresident to maintain insurance whenever the nonresident uses a vehicle in that
state or province, your policy will provide at
least the required minimum amounts and
types of coverage.
B. No one will be entitled to duplicate payments for
the same elements of loss.
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
When this policy is certified as future proof of financial
responsibility, this policy shall comply with the law to
the extent required.
OTHER INSURANCE
If there is other applicable liability insurance we will
pay only our share of the loss. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all
applicable limits. However, any insurance we provide
for a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any
other collectible insurance.

CoDvright. Insurance Services Off ice, Inc., 1985
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INSURING AGREEMENT

8.

A. We will pay reasonable expenses incurred for necessary medical and funeral services because of
"bodily injury:"
1.

Caused by accident; and

2. Sustained by an "insured."

b.
c.

We will pay only those expenses incurred within 3
years from the date of the accident.
B. "Insured" as used in this Part means:
1. You or any "family member:"
a. while "occupying;" or
b. as a pedestrian when struck by;
a motor vehicle designed for use mainly on
public roads or a trailer of any type.
2. Any other person while "occupying" "your
covered auto."
EXCLUSIONS
We do not provide Medical Payments Coverage for any
person for "bodily injury:"
1.

Sustained while "occupying" any motorized
vehicle having fewer than four wheels.

2. Sustained while "occupying" "your covered
auto" when it is being used to carry persons or
property for a fee. This exclusion (2.) does not
apply to a share-t he-expense car pool.
3. Sustained while "occupying" any vehicle lom cated for use as a residence or premises.
4. Occurring during the course of employment if
workers' compensation benefits are required
or available for the "bodily injury."
5. Sustained while "occupying," or when struck
by, any vehicle (other than "your covered
auto") which is:
a. owned by you; or
b. furnished or available for your regular
use.
6. Sustained while "occupying," or when struck
by, any vehicle (other than "your covered
v
auto") which is:
a. owned by any "family member;" or
b. furnished or available for the regular use
of any "family member."
However, this exclusion (6.) does not apply to
you.
7. Sustained while "occupying" a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that person is entitled to do so.
o n r\r\ M g\M » ^

Sustained while "occupying" a vehicle when it
is being used in the "business" of an "insured." This exclusion (8.) does not apply to
"bodily injury" sustained while "occupying"
a:
a. private passenger auto;

9.

pickup or van that you own; or
"trailer" used with a vehicle described in
a. orb. above.
Caused by or as a consequence of:
a. discharge of a nuclear weapon (even if accidental);

b. war (declared or undeclared);
c. civil war;
d. insurrection: or
e. rebellion or revolution.
10. From or as a consequence of the following,
whether controlled or uncontro//ed or however caused:
a. nuclear reaction;
b. radiation; or
c. radioactive contamination.
LIMIT OF LIABILITY
A. The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for
this coverage is our maximum limit of liability for
each person injured in any one accident. This is
the most we will pay regardless of the number of:
1. "Insureds;"
2. Claims made;
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations, or
4. Vehicles involved in the accident.
B. Any amounts otherwise payable for expenses under this coverage shall be reduced by any amounts
paid or payable for the same expenses under Part
A or PartC
C. No payment will be made unless the injured person or that person's legal representative agrees in
writing that any payment shall be applied toward
any settlement or judgment that person receives
under Part A or PartC.
OTHER INSURANCE
If there is other applicable auto medical payments insurance we will pay only our share of the loss. Our
share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears
to the total of all applicable limits. However, any insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not
own shall be excess over any other collectible auto insurance providing payments for medical or funeral expenses.

OTHER INSURANCE

1.

If there is other applicable similar insurance we will
pay only our share of the loss. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all
applicable limits. However, any insurance we provide
with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess
over any other collectible insurance.

2.

Pay the expenses it incurs; and

Bear the expenses of the third arbitrator
equally.
t
Unless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration
will take place in the county in which the "insured" lives. Local rules of law as to procedure and
evidence will apply. A decision agreed to by two of
the arbitrators will be binding as to:

ARBITRATION

1.

A. If we and an "insured" do not agree:
1. Whether that person is legally entitled to recover damages under this Part; or

Whether the "insured" is legally entitled to
recover damages, and

2. The amount of damages. This applies only if
the amount does not exceed the minimum
limit for bodily injury liability specified by the
financial responsibility law of the state in
which "your covered auto" is principally garaged. If the amount exceeds that limit, either
party may demand the right to a trial. This
demand must be made within 60 days of the
arbitrators' decision. If this demand is not
made, the amount of damages agreed to by
the arbitrators will be binding.

2. As to the amount of damages;
either party may make a written demand for arbitration. In this event, each party will select an arbitrator. The two arbitrators will select a third. If they
cannot agree within 30 days, either may request
that selection be made by a judge of a court having
jurisdiction.
B. Each party will:

PART D-COVERAGE FOR DAMAGE TO YOUR AUTO
INSURING AGREEMENT
A. We will pay for direct and accidental loss to "your
covered auto" or any "non-owned auto," including
their equipment, minus any applicable deductible
shown in the Declarations. We will pay for loss to
"your covered auto" caused by:
1. Other than "collision" only if the Declarations
indicate that Other Than Collision Coverage is
provided for that auto.
•
2. "Collision" only if the Declarations indicate
that Collision Coverage is provided for that
auto.
If there is a loss to a "non-owned auto," we will
provide the broadest coverage applicable to any
"your covered auto" shown in the Declarations.
B. "Collision" means the upset of "your covered
auto" or its impact with another vehicle or object.
Loss caused by the following is considered other
than "collision:"
1. Missiles or
6. Hail, water or flood;
falling objects;
7. Malicious mischief or
Fire;
vandalism;
>•
Theft or larceny;
8. Riot or civil commoExplosion or
tion;
earthquake;
9. Contact with bird or
5. Windstorm;
animal; or
10. Breakage of glass.

If breakage of glass is caused by a "collision," you
may elect to have it considered a loss caused by
"collision."

C.

"Non-owned auto" means any private passenger
auto, pickup, van or "trailer" not owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any
"family member" while in the custody of or being
operated by you or any "family member." However, "non-owned auto" does not include any vehicle used as a temporary substitute for a vehicle
you own which is out of normal use because of its:
1. Breakdown;
2. Repair;
3. Servicing;

4. Loss; or
5. Destruction.

TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES
In addition, we will pay up to $10 per day, to a maximum of $300, for transportation expenses incurred by
you. This applies only in the event of the total theft of
"your covered auto." We will pay only transportation
expenses incurred during the period:
1.

Beginning 48 hours after the theft; and

2.

Ending when "your covered auto" is returned
to use or we pay for its loss.

IQft*
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ADDENDUM "B"
Amendment of Policy Provisions - Utah
[Taken from Record pp. 45 - 68]

AMENDMENT OF POLICY PROVISIONS - UTAH
PP01 9 3 1 2 88
I. LIABILITY COVERAGE
Part A is amended as follows:
A. Paragraph A. of the Insuring Agreement is replaced by the following:
INSURING AGREEMENT
We will pay damages for "bodily injury" or
•property damage" for which any "insured"
becomes legally responsible because of an
auto accident. We will settle or defend, as
we consider appropriate, any claim or suit
asking for these damages. In addition to our
limit of liability, we will pay all defense costs
we incur. Our duty to settle or defend ends
when our limit of liability for this coverage has
been exhausted. We have no duty to defend
any suit or settle any claim for "bodily injury"
or "property damage" not covered under this
policy.
B. The following Exclusion is added:
We do not provide Liability Coverage for any
person for "bodily injury" to you or any "family member" to the extent that the limits of liability for this coverage exceed the limits of
liability required by the Utah Safety Responsibility Act.
II. UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE
Part C is amended as follows:
A. Section 3 of the definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" is replaced by the following:
"Uninsured motor vehicle" means a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type:
3. Which is a hit-and-run vehicle whose operator or owner cannot be identified and
which hits or causes an accident resulting
in "bodily injury" without hitting:
a. you or any "family member;"
• b. a vehicle which you or any "family
member" are "occupying;" or
c. "your covered auto."
If there is no physical contact with the
hit-and-run vehicle the facts of the accident must be proved. We will only accept
clear and convincing evidence, which must
consist of more than the "insured's" testimony.

B. Exclusion A.1. is replaced by the following:
We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for "bodily injury" sustained by any
person:
1 . While "occupying" or when struck by any
motor vehicle owned by you or any "family
member" for which the security required
by the Utah Safety Responsibility Act is
not in effect. This includes a trailer of any
type used with that vehicle.
C. The Other Insurance provision is replaced by
the following:
OTHER INSURANCE
If there is other applicable similar insurance
available under more than one policy or provision of coverage:
1 . Any recovery for damages for "bodily injury" sustained by an "insured" may equal
but not exceed the highest of the applicable limit for any one vehicle under this or
any other insurance.
2. Any insurance we provide with respect to
a vehicle you do not own shall be excess
over any other collectible insurance.
3. We will pay only our share of the loss. Our
share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all applicable
limits.
III. DUTIES AFTER AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS
The following is added to paragraph A. of Part E:
Notice to our authorized representative is considered notice to us.

This endorsement must be attached to the Change Endorsement when issued after the policy is written.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
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Robert B. Sykes, Esq.
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